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HUMAN RIGHTS IN A CHANGING WORLD

*The Problem of Preserving
Human Values
In the Upheavals Caused by
Science and Technology*

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INTRODUCTION

On December 10th, 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted and proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 1973 therefore marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of this epochal event. The present publication is an acknowledgement of the quarter century of endeavour which has elapsed since the implementation of a document whose aim is no less than the extension of full participation in human rights to each and every individual on the face of the earth. For this reason, the document is well named Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In previous ages, such an ambition could have justly been described as grandiose, to say the least. Such, however, is not the case in the modern context. The proliferation of world travel as well as the great increase in mass-communications have produced that paradoxical "global village" of Marshall McLuhan. As a result, one can be optimistic that the universality of the Declaration of Human Rights is at least a practical ideal in the modern age of world-travel and mass communication.

The first promulgation of the Universal Declaration has served to focus the attention of the world upon the all-important subject of human rights and has thereby

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produced a great volume of literature upon the topic. Indeed, it would be safe to say that never in the known history of humanity has the subject of human rights been so universally and exhaustively publicized. Too, this avails on all levels - the communal, the national and the international ones. The product of so much literary labour can be compared to a magnificent edifice which has been constructed from the hopes and disappointments, ideals and disillusionments of the world's peoples in this second half of the twentieth century.

This idea of a great edifice constructed by human endeavour invites further examination of a particular aspect of the metaphor. From architecture, we know that it is of fundamental importance that the more enormous and massive is some building, so much the more solid and substantial must be the foundations which support it. Otherwise, should these foundations fail to sustain the burden which has been built upon them, then there will follow of necessity, the collapse of the entire superstructure. It follows too, that the more imposing and massive the superstructure, so much the more catastrophic will be the ensuing collapse. Indeed, in an ironical manner, the very grandeur of the building contributes to its own ruination pulling all down upon itself. As the popular saying

puts it: the higher they are, the harder they fall.

Applying this metaphor to the topic of human rights, it would seem to follow that while the world can well applaud the voluminous printed attention which the subject of human rights has received in the recent past, the sheer bulk of literature calls all the more for careful considerations about the nature and validity of the basic concepts upon which all else ultimately rests. Failing this, concern about the basic concepts, the imposing superstructure may well one day collapse for want of sustaining support. Be it noted too, in accord with the previous architectural metaphor, that the great mass of publications, imposed as it were, upon the supporting basic conceptions is no guarantee against ultimate ruination. On the contrary - as has been explained, the sheer bulk of printed attention can all the more effectively precipitate collapse, once the foundations have failed.

These rather elementary considerations therefore suggest the nature of the topic with which we will be principally concerned here. This topic may be phrased as a seemingly simple question: What is the basis of human rights in the present age of upheavals created by science and technology? What fundamental concepts or ideas serve as the ultimate support for all the voluminous attention

which the subject of human rights has received in the recent past, and more particularly in the last quarter of a century? Indeed, on the occasion of this anniversary, it would seem that nothing could be of more fundamental importance than a re-appraisal of the assumptions which are always so inconspicuously present at the basis of the vast amount of attention that human rights have received since the appearance of the Universal Declaration in 1948.

THE INEQUALITY OF MANKIND

The obvious answer to the question about the ultimate, basis of human rights would seem to be both simple and straightforward, as well as eliminating the need for further treatment of the matter: human rights exist by universal acclaim: all (or almost all) people concede that all other people, being equally humans like themselves, have human rights.

However for all its evidence to the enlightened mind of the twentieth century, this idea of all people being equally human and therefore possessing human rights is a very novel idea indeed. As recently in history as the era which contained the building of the British Empire, it was far from being the supposed self-evident truth that it is believed to be today.

When Captain Cook first encountered the Australian aboriginals in Botany Bay in 1770, it would be sheer romanticism to envision him as having seen these natives as free and equal human beings. Indeed, as the subsequent and innumerable cruelties to those unfortunate aboriginals amply demonstrate, far from being considered as free and equal by the white man, they were commonly held to be scarcely human. The same avails too of the Indians and Eskimos of early Canadian history.

If there is one lesson which becomes abundantly clear from a study of history, it is the widespread and indeed seemingly universal doctrine of the essential inequality of mankind. To go further back in history is only to find more evidence to substantiate this conviction. The age of the divine right of kings is hardly notable for the kings' eagerness to share this divinity with all their fellow-men. As for Medieval Europe it was built upon the basic conviction of the essential inequality of men. Serfs, lords, kings and clergy scarcely express a basic equality common to all men. Further back in history the inequalities seem all the more pronounced. Christianity may have eventually succeeded in abolishing slavery, but the Roman Empire was built upon this institution which so emphasized the inequality of men as to make certain ones the goods and property of others. Earlier in Greece, even so enlightened a philosopher as Aristotle had no difficulty in justifying slavery as one of the necessary conditions of civilization.

THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

From these few considerations, it would seem that the persuasion of the inequality of mankind really stems from the remote past and has increasingly disappeared with the continued progress of the human race. From this

it follows (conveniently enough) that we of the present western world, being the most progressive of all people, are therefore the most committed to the essential equality of mankind. Such a conclusion would seem to follow inexorably from an evolutionary view of history: every day in every way, the human race is getting better and better, (to adopt a phrase from Emil Coué). Too, this persuasion is possessed of a flattering appeal because it envisions us as the pinnacle of a process of perfectioning which has been in force throughout history.

The above view of history is of course based upon Darwin's theory of evolution which sees the various species of living things as becoming increasingly more perfect with the flow of time. This theory has proven valuable in explaining changes in organisms, from their efforts to cope with their various environments. In this regard, the theory is most valuable as applied to pre-history, or the vast and seemingly endless lapse of time which preceded the comparatively small period occupied by recorded history. Too, Darwin's theory appeals to us on the basis of individual experience. Every individual who is sustained by optimism likes to picture himself (or herself) as (like a good wine) improving with age.

However, with regard to the present context, the question which is of concern is whether the human race

has become more perfect, at least in the span of recorded history. Using the argument from analogy, we are tempted to conclude from evolutionary thinking that such has indeed been the case. Here, however, a qualification must be inserted. If it is question merely of perfection in the technical sense, there can be little doubt that the answer must be in the affirmative, inasmuch as each generation has inherited the know-how of those which preceded it. To this extent there has been an accumulation of knowledge in the sciences and the technologies; an accumulation which has made possible the ever-increasing power of man over nature. Thus, modern chemistry and physics are built upon the atomic theory of matter. This theory (derived from the ancient Greeks) appeared in Europe in the fifteenth century and was used with increasing success by generations of scientists to explain natural phenomena. The accumulation of knowledge which resulted has been the common heritage of the practitioners in these sciences. Only by the succeeding stages of refinement made possible by this transmission of knowledge has modern atomic physics been able to reach its present level of sophistication.

Likewise too, in other sciences, progress has been made possible by the same kind of transmission of inherited knowledge. Each generation has been able to

make progress by capitalizing upon the knowledge of its forebears in that particular science. Sir Isaac Newton well expressed the advantages of tradition in science when he observed that he could see further than previous scientists only because he was standing on their shoulders.

The above perfecting of man refers to man the scientist, or the knower. Due to the accumulation of knowledge made possible by the various scientific traditions, there have resulted many new discoveries which have made for the perfecting of such sciences. Something akin to the evolutionary process of biology would seem to apply. The passage of time has resulted in more and more improvements in the various sciences.

Our question (which led us into these few considerations on evolution) concerns not only the growth in man's accumulation of science down through the ages, but rather the apparent emergence in history of the notion of human equality. It would seem at first that the widespread acceptance of this notion has, like the growth of science, emerged by a kind of evolutionary process. While there may well be some truth to this, it would seem that the case is not as direct as that of the sciences of nature. These sciences are "objective" - that is to say, there are formulae and procedures, dictated by theory - all of which

can be written down in books and followed in a perfectly objective manner. These various disciplines all share the quality which is (to put it very crudely) common to all recipe books. They all concern something "out there".

The implementation of human rights would seem to imply the same kind of procedure. Desirable norms of behaviour are entrusted to books which are read by many people from which will follow (in much the same way as in the case of the sciences) mass-behaviour of the type desired. This would seem to be true to the extent of what this example has in common with that of the "objective" sciences of nature; that is to say, as regards the intellectual aspect common to both examples. The dissemination of knowledge on human rights is certainly a pre-requirement of the wider social adoption of such rights inasmuch as knowledge is the harbinger of action.

However, to be informed on the subject of human rights does not necessarily imply a personal opting for these ideals. Indeed, one can become perfectly well acquainted with such matters even in order the better to continue exploiting one's fellow men through the discovery of legal loopholes. Thus, the use to which one puts such acquired dispositions. Here, it would seem, is a "subjective" quality which contrasts with the "objective" character of the sciences of nature.

SCIENCE AND HUMAN VALUES

The above distinction may seem like a very fine one, but to quote a Chestertonianism, it is also a very sharp one. The essential difference would seem to be that which avails between man the observer and man the participator. E. A. Burt has argued in his The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science for the alienating effect of modern science upon man. It has tended to make him into an "objective" observer of the world of abstractions in which he cannot have any part. Such was indeed the very basis of the "new science" of Galileo, the great pioneer in this manner of abstraction. The result of course, can only be an ambivalent dichotomy.

For the narrow-minded atomic physicist, for example, the "real" world is not the richly sensuous world which greets him every morning when he wakes up, but the thin, abstract world of his scientific abstractions. Yet he still has to go on living in the world which crowds in upon his senses during every waking moment. The dilemma is well depicted by Eddington in the opening pages of his The Nature of the Physical World, when he describes himself as sitting down to write his book at his two tables - the good, solid, reassuring table of common sense on the one hand, and on the other, the tenuous table of science which

in mostly empty space with atomic nuclei speeding around in it. Piet Hein has captured this interpretation of nature in his witty little poem:

"Nature, it seems, is the popular
name
For milliards and milliards and
milliards
Of particles playing their infinite
game
Of billiards and billiards and
billiards."

Obviously enough, in this mechanical world of speeding inanimate particles man, as man has no place. The world created by science is anything but a human world; there is no place for man, (let alone human values) in a world constituted entirely of speeding particles. For this reason, Burt has accused the scientists of creating a world to which man himself must ever remain an alien. All he can do with such a world is observe it, recording endless measurements about it in his scientific notebooks. In this "objective" view of reality, the scientist likes to think of himself as being entirely devoid of any personal prejudices (whence perhaps the significant ceremonial donning of the white laboratory coat - the symbol of purity of intention). He cannot afford to "encourage" an experiment to produce these results rather than those. Ideally, he must remain perfectly indifferent to the outcome of all his experiments and observations. His only legitimate role is that of an entirely objective observer.

THE HUMANISTS

Quite opposed to this cheerless world-view there is the contrasting camp of what can be broadly named the humanists. These people are anything but apathetic about the world in which man lives. As a result, rather than seeing man as an indifferent observer of reality, they conceive of him as being very much a participator in his environment. This is the "subjective" view of reality, as opposed to the "objective" view of the scientists. While these latter renounce all preferences about reality, the humanists by contrast are very vocal on this same topic. In a very general way, and as the name would imply, the humanists are not concerned so much with an "objective" view of reality, but rather with the many facets of human experience. The scientists could, for their part object that this is a very "subjective" appraisal of reality, since it is concerned with human rather than "objective" values.

C. P. Snow, in his The Two Cultures, has drawn attention to the polarization which has occurred between these two outlooks - the "objective" or scientific viewpoint, as opposed to the "subjective", or humanistic perspective. Between the two camps, not only is there little communication, but as Snow intimates, there may even be a growing hostility.

On the other hand, it is reassuring to note that this polarization is not such a new phenomenon in western thought. Certainly we may have become more aware of it in the recent past, due principally to the fantastic growth in the experimental sciences during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Until the time of Newton, and particularly from the renaissance onwards, the humanists had prevailed. Even the sciences of nature reflected this perspective. Thus, the falling stone was considered to be pulling itself back to the earth from which it had been separated by being thrown up in the air. Beginning with Galileo, and more particularly Newton, this and other such phenomena were regarded from an opposite perspective, or what came to be known as a more "objective" viewpoint. Thus, the stone was considered to fall due to the earth attracting it, so that the stone became a passive entity, surrendering to a mysterious force which came to be called "gravity"

Admittedly, this example is a mere straw in the wind, but nevertheless it does indicate the drastic change of perspective which the scientific revolution brought with it. Again, we can go much further back in history to the remarkable personality of Socrates who brought a dramatic change in Greek science (or philosophy) with his

questions about man and the nature of the good life. Prior to his innovations Greek thinkers had been almost totally preoccupied with the external phenomena of nature. As Cornford so well points out in his Before and After Socrates, the change of perspective was from the external to the internal; from the phenomena of nature of that paradoxical phenomenon - the human animal itself.

These considerations are of the utmost importance to the present topic of human rights because they point up the need for taking account of both poles of human thought. Quite obviously human rights are principally the concern of the humanistic viewpoint. On the other hand, a little reflection will manifest the need for the services of the other "objective" or scientific outlook. Thus, scientific studies are necessary in an attempt to ascertain what barriers exist to the exercise of human rights up to, and including, the international level. Accordingly, in the recent past, UNESCO published a study on the conditions of literacy in the various countries of the world.¹

This and other such studies would not have been possible were it not for the inspiration and impetus provided by the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which also was in itself an objectification of the basic freedoms which should be accorded to all persons, regardless of race, colour or creed or form of government of the

country in which they happened to reside. Here too, we see an advantage of utilizing the scientific viewpoint which attempts to objectify criteria and so in the case of human rights, avoid arbitrary abuses of human freedom.

The point of the previous considerations is that when it comes to the subject of human rights, the humanistic viewpoint is obviously of principal importance, but it would not therefore follow that the scientific or objective perspective is to be avoided or even despised. To get the whole picture, as it were, it is necessary to have both viewpoints working harmoniously together. In this present case of human rights, the humanistic perspective would be comparatively helpless and incomplete without the information and criteria provided by the scientific mentality. On the other hand, it would be a serious error to believe (under the influence of the present worship of science) that "science" would be able to establish once and for all the true nature of the basic principles upon which human rights are founded, or to answer such evasive questions as the nature of love, or of the realities which are of central concern to the human experience will ever remain opaque to the strongest searchlights of science. To pretend otherwise would be to indulge in either wishful thinking or mere hocus-pocus.

THE REBELLION AGAINST SCIENCE

Interestingly enough, this popular persuasion about the omnipotence of science is a phenomenon of the recent past. However, a more up-to-date appraisal of popular attitudes would, I suspect, see it as fading in intensity. The last few years have witnessed a growing rebellion against technology with its rape of nature and the increasing menace of pollution. All this of course can be imputed to the sciences which provided the knowhow. As a result, both science and technology have tended to come under popular censure, particularly among the youth of the "progressive" nations.

This shift in popular opinion has induced a vague yearning to return to "Nature". Evidence of this is a common desire among people in their late teens and early twenties to quit the populous centres in favour of a rustic type of existence where they try to make a living by fighting the elements and farming the land. This ideal of a return to nature puts one in mind of Thoreau. Along with it too, there tends to go the ideal of the "noble savage" made fashionable by Daniel Defoe and (in another context), by the French philosopher, Jean Jacques Rousseau.

In any case, this disillusionment with science can only be applauded as a much needed return to a balanced perspective. Blind faith in the omnipotence of science is

a form of exaggerated extremism. It fosters what Carl Becker in The Heavenly City of the 18th Century Philosophers would describe as a "climate of opinion". This climate of opinion foists the most irrational and unrealistic expectations upon science: it is going to solve all the problems of the universe, whether human or divine. This has been the blind and obstinate prejudice not only of the previous decades but of the last hundred years. Originally of course it stems back to the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century with its orgy of faith in human reason. This extravagance owed much also to the testimony of science, inasmuch as the same age contained the genius of Newton who formulated what were taken to be the very laws which held the whole of the heavens together. Truly, (or so it seemed) the genius of man was on the very threshold of discovering it's own omnipotence.

During the nineteenth century, encouraged by innumerable scientific discoveries, this worship of science rose up like a mighty wave carrying all before it. Humanity had at last discovered a new religion which was far more efficacious than the old thread-bare religion of Christianity. The name of the new religion was Science. This became the "power-bring word" of William James' essay on Pragmatism. It became the word which terminated all further debate - the dead-end of the

metaphysical quest. Accordingly, "Science" became the ultimate authority beyond which by popular consensus there existed no other court of appeal. While this extravagant authoritarianism has subsided somewhat in the present era, it is interesting to remark upon the enduring appeal in the public psyche of such derivatives as "scientific" and "scientifically". Proof of this persistence is found in the number of objects on the market which claim to be based upon some "scientifically proven formula" or some other phrase incorporating the magical word.

These observations are very pertinent to the present topic because they not only provide us with a much needed understanding of important factors which tend to affect our thinking, but also, (as in the present case), of factors which can be instructive in illuminating the more important relations between the functions of science and the role of human rights in modern life. Such insights can be of the greatest value in assessing the task which faces us.

Take the growing disenchantment with technology and science, for instance. To those who have blind faith in the "law of progress", this represents a step backwards. For myself, I have more faith in the law of the pendulum than in the law of progress. The human race tends (very

generally) to swing from one extreme to another. For the last three hundred years, the human mind has first been goaded by the quest of power, secondly distended by the achievements expected of it and thirdly has been rendered quite dyspeptic by the incredible mass of ill-digested facts forced upon it. As a result, the next three centuries or so may well witness a harsh reaction to the other extreme. History will then have to struggle through an age notorious to posterity for the comotose and moribund state of the little intellectual life which it contained.

More than once in his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle insists upon virtue as being the middle path between two extremes. The foolhardy fighter who leads blindly with his chin is just as much to be censured as the coward who will not fight under any circumstances. The virtuous attitude to fighting lies somewhere in between these extremes. Likewise, the present reaction against science among the youth may well snowball into a massive conglomerate of passive anti-intellectualism. Let us rather be honest and admit that science has been worshipped in the past and has been misrepresented as man's god rather than as his servant. We would be much the wiser in the future if we expected far less of science and much more of the humanistic viewpoint of life. In essence, the

challenge is to make science and all its discoveries subservient to human needs, rather than vice versa.

SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND UTOPIA

On the other hand, history teaches us that momentous eras have a habit of casting long shadows after them. The great scientific era is just such a case in point. Whatever the future destiny of the scientific movement, the effects of the last three centuries will be with the human race for some considerable time to come. This raises questions of particular relevance to the subject of human rights inasmuch as the scientific movement has given birth to the vision of a scientific utopia. Here it is not merely question of a utopia made possible by the multiplication of all kinds of conveniences produced as the fruits of scientific inquiry, but rather of utopia in which the powers of science will be employed to modify the nature of man himself. This possibility is of supreme relevance to the domain of human rights and accordingly will be dealt with here.

The vision of utopia, or the ideal society, is probably as old as the human race itself. The first such example in our tradition is found in the biblical account of Adam and Eve in the garden of Eden. Basically, the over-riding theme is one of universal harmony - harmony

between God and mankind, between man and woman and between the human species and the rest of material creation. This blissful state, as we all know, was shattered by man's fall from favour with the divinity.

Again in the Greek tradition we find the plan for the ideal society in Plato's Republic. Here it is noteworthy that the animating ideal of the whole inquiry is a search for the nature of the virtue of justice in society. In the fifth century of the present era, St. Augustine laboured for some thirteen years over his great masterpiece - the City of God. Unfortunately, due to his drastic dichotomy between body and soul, as a vision of the ideal society in man's present condition, this work leaves much to be desired. The focus of Augustine's attention is not the earthly human society but rather the angelic society of the after-life when man will have been released from mortal flesh and endowed with a spiritual body. The ambivalence of Augustine's attitude towards human society in its terrestrial condition was to haunt western society for the succeeding thousand years.

The word "utopia" for describing the ideal society comes into its own with Thomas More's Utopia of the sixteenth century. This model society stressed the inculcation of the virtues and the nobility of the simple life inasmuch as the Utopians were brought up to despise

gold and luxuries which it fostered. After More, with the appearance of several subsequent treatises on the ideal society (including Campanella's City of the Sun), the utopian dream seems to have faded from the literary scene, only to re-emerge with an important novelty of emphasis in the nineteenth century.

The new and distinctive element came to be the emphasis upon externalities such as ownership and the equitable distribution of wealth. Most memorable in this regard was the ideal communistic society of Marx and Engels founded upon the common ownership of the means of production. Considering the upheavals caused by the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century and the grinding poverty and inhumanity upon which the crude factories thrived, the novel emphasis upon the material necessities of life is most understandable.

As has been seen, the utopian tradition has undergone some significant changes of emphasis in the courses of ages. However, it remained for the twentieth century to contribute an unprecedented dimension to the vision of the ideal society. The new vision derived from forces which would have been unthinkable to our forebears. The achievements of science and technology in the nineteenth century had wrought momentous transformations in man's environment. The utopias of that era were by and large

attempts at rectifying the social injustices resulting from these revolutionary changes.

The next step in the seemingly logical progression was to be the most drastic of all - if the resources of science and technology had shown themselves virtually omnipotent in transforming the human environment, why then should they not be brought to bear on man himself? Whereas the previous utopians had attempted to fashion the ideal society for man, the new Planners took an antithetical approach to the bothersome problem - why not mold the ideal man for society? If science and technology had proven themselves successful beyond man's wildest dreams in remaking the human environment, why should not their immense resources be now brought to bear upon the refashioning of man himself? This was the dimension without precedent in the utopian tradition and a proposed course of action to which the question of human rights is of acute relevance.

The momentum fostered by the cult of science in the last three centuries is a mighty force whose purpose is now insistent. The next logical step is the remaking of man himself. Up to now we have been able to cling persistently to a few pious sentiments about the rights of man. But these will be of little consolation when

even the concept of human nature is swept away by the might currents of change. Man can no longer claim a privileged position in a world constituted solely by the motion of atoms in the void. Accordingly, man himself in common with the rest of material creation must sacrifice his very own nature to the irresistible forces of change. These relentless forces will then have achieved their greatest climax, as Bernard Murchland well explains in his The New Iconoclasm:

"To alter human nature itself, it seems to me would be the ultimate victory of the powers of change, the final test of their supremacy in our time. When we reflect that within sight is the artificial synthesis of cells and the use of chemical agents to recast the human psyche, the human life may one day be created and controlled biochemically, imagination fails us and iconoclasm takes on its fullest apocalyptic meaning." 2

THE DEGRADATION OF MAN

Implicit in this novel ideal of refashioning mankind is of course a complete cleavage with the traditional notion of human nature as something sacred and inviolable. But in retrospect it is possible to see that the way had long been paved for just such a traumatic transformation. Prior to the Copernican revolution in the middle of the sixteenth century it was all too

evident to man that he was the very hub of creation. Around his terrestrial abode revolved with rhythmic regularity, the sun and moon and planets as well as the countless multitudes of stars, great and small. Copernicus's book, On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Orbs, which appeared in 1543, was to change all this.

One can begin to appreciate the magnitude of the change by comparing C. S. Lewis', The Discarded Image, with Alexander Koyré's, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe. From being so evidently the centre of the very universe, the earth upon which man lived eventually became an insignificant speck of cosmic dust rotating around a low powered sun in a high powered universe. The consequent subtle effect upon man was to be truly traumatic, as George Sylvester Viereck so well explains in his Seven Against Man:

"When man permitted himself to be persuaded that he was only an earth-worm crawling on a seventh-rate planet that circles around a sixth-rate sun in a fifth-rate universe, he suffered a psychic shock from which, unless he rejects the interpretation, he can never recover." 3

Any notion of a once-noble humanity was to be further degraded by the more obvious implications of subsequent speculations. Newton's theory of universal gravitation in the eighteenth century fostered (all unwittingly)

the notion of a clock-work universe. As a result, the once-majestic and omnipotent Jehovah, the very guarantor of man's rights and dignity became degraded to the menial rank of cosmic mechanic. The same notion of a clock-work universe also posed insurmountable obstacles to man's birth-right to free will, inasmuch as he too must be subject to the same inexorable mechanical laws which seemed all too convincingly to impose their iron-clad rules of determinism upon the universe and all its contents.

If the the Newtonian picture of the universe hinted at such implications they became all the more irresistible with Leibniz's doctrine of pre-established harmony whereby all events of the universe came to be fore-ordained by some relentless deity. Later in the same era, the noble and pietistic Immanuel Kant was led into the baffling labyrinths of epistemology in an attempt to salvage man's freewill in the face of a mechanical cosmic determinism.

Momentous as were the implications of the scientific discoveries of the eighteenth century, it remained above all for the achievements of the succeeding age to effect the crowning climax of man's humiliation. On the practical level, the stalwart peasantry found itself uprooted from the maternal soil and herded into subhuman conditions in anonymous cities, there to become the unwilling servants of inanimate machines. Wages were minimal and the duties

and arduous hours of labour were maximal. This rape of the peasantry is commemorated (even if with excessive nostalgia) in Oliver Goldsmith's The Deserted Village of 1770.

On the speculative level, the nineteenth century begot theories no less pejorative in their implications for the continuing degradation of mankind. In mid-century, Darwin's epochal theory of evolution burst forth upon the world bringing in its wake the seemingly inescapable conclusion that man was nothing but the contingent by-product of some grand evolutionary process. From this aspect, the way had already been paved for Darwin by the system-thinking of the German Idealists who had succeeded Kant.

Wöhler's synthesis of urea in the nineteenth century also had dramatic implications. This was the first of the many "organic" substances to be synthesized in the laboratory. Previously such substances had been thought to be capable of only being produced by the living organism. The synthesis of such compounds in the laboratory seemed to indicate that the gap between the living and the non-living was not as unbridgeable as had been taught. As far as man was concerned, these accomplishments meant that it became increasingly permissible to think of him as merely so much carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen and the various trace elements. The ultimate consequences

of such thinking is well illustrated by the atrocities of the extermination camps in Nazi Germany. How many inmates would have to be incinerated to produce a ton of fertilizer?

The reduction of all visible creation to mere atoms in motion is of course no new fantasy. The Greek atomists of the fifth century before Christ were confident that all could be explained by the movements of atoms in the void. But they were mere amateurs at the same compared with the complex sophistications of modern science. The important point here however is the widespread conviction that this is the "basic" view of reality. As a result, human values all too easily appeared mere superficial phenomena when compared with science's resolution of matter into its ultimate constituents. Man too, was part of material creation and so while the humanists were to be humoured, their babblings about "humanity" and such things as "human values" and "human destiny" were not to be taken too seriously. All ultimately reduced to the motions of atoms in the void.

Having thus taken the world to pieces, modern man will now proceed to reassemble it in a new manner more to his own liking. After all, Jehovah had lacked the wisdom to consult with the human intelligence before

he threw the cosmos together in a mere six days. The first aim in the task of remaking creation is the production of better forms of life which will not be afflicted with the deficiencies which plague the present ones. In the production of such new forms of life, the first significant step is of course the synthesis of the DNA molecule; an ambitious project indeed, but one which has already been largely accomplished. From these basic "bricks" it will be possible (hopefully) to build new forms of life including ultimately, humanoid beings.

THE BRAVE NEW WORLD

About the only worthwhile objections to the new proposed refashioning of mankind would be those coming from the Traditionalists. They would object that it is infamous to have human beings (or more accurately humanoids) tailor-made to fit neatly into given niches in society. However, the Traditionalists have very little upon which to base their objections seeing that the scientific and industrial revolutions have shot tradition all to pieces.

Tradition supposes a past-orientated society, but the present society aims in the very opposite direction; being future-orientated. Therefore, should science render the refashioning of humanity a feasible project, in the

absence of traditional taboos this purely theoretical goal could become a highly desirable one, as C. S. Lewis observes in The Abolition of Man:

"Traditional values are to be 'debunked' and mankind to be cut out in some fresh shape at the will (which must, by hypothesis, be an arbitrary will) of some few lucky people in one lucky generation which has learned how to do it." 4

Lewis's work appeared in 1944, towards the end of the Second World War. Some thirteen years earlier, the celebrated novel - Brave New World of Aldous Huxley had depicted just such a society in which all citizens were manufactured from selected biological materials of sperm and ova in accord with the predetermined needs of society. The resulting embryos were early prepared for their future vocations by conditioning of the foetus in its laboratory container. Later, as infants, judicious reinforcement of desired conduct was achieved through pleasure rewards. Determent from inappropriate interests was effected through the use of pain.

In his more recent (though less impressive) Brave New World Revisited, Huxley emphasized the many ways in which the world had moved closer to the condition of his earlier novel in the intervening years since he wrote it. Huxley's apprehensions would have been much further substantiated had he lived to see B.F. Skinner appear on the

contemporary scene. The Skinnerians stand unequivocally for the universal scientific conditioning of all future infants. All the nurseries of the world would be scientific conditioning boxes in which the desirable actions of infants would be reinforced by pleasurable rewards while undesirable actions would be discouraged by painful consequences. By such a massive programme of conditioning from the earliest years, future generations would be raised avoiding (hopefully) unsocial acts and (again hopefully) practising pretty uniformly such acts as are considered socially desirable. Thus, with the advent of Skinner and his theories, the type of "education" found in Huxley's Brave New World is actually being proposed as a desirable method of bringing up future generations in our own scientifically orientated society.

Again, even before the arrival of the Skinnerians, there had been some significant developments in the same direction. George Orwell's novel, 1984, depicts a society in which thought-control is a basic social reality, universally supervised by the omniscient Big Brother. Interestingly enough, thought control is big business in the present world of advertising, as Vance Packard has shown with many examples in his The Hidden Persuaders. Countless millions of dollars have been sunk in systematic

studies of the public mind to probe its weak points and thereby to induce people to buy many things which they do not really want, all in the cause of increasing production.

Regarding the Pavlovian conditioning of humanity as proposed by the Skinnerians, it is noteworthy that in a subtler way this has become pretty well standard practice in the world of big business. The Organization Man of William Whyte (Jr.) shows the all-pervading influence of the "company" upon the lives of its "executive material". Those who aspire to positions of power must be willing to sacrifice a great deal of their privacy and of their own spontaneous individuality - they must be ready and willing to be ground down and groomed into "company material".

Accordingly, the silent power of the "company" extends into practically all facets of such executives' domestic lives. Whyte claims that with a given upward-striving employee of a company, it is possible from his company-status to predict the kind of car he drives, what kind of neighbourhood he lives in, what type of house he is paying off, the kind of wife and family, etc., etc., ad nauseam. Fortunately, in more recent years there has been some shift away from this wearisome predictability and total surrender to the "company". It is to be hoped that this trend continues.

The fact remains however, that there are forces at work in the twentieth century which are the expression of a persistent trend in preceding centuries. Of themselves, these forces would make for the implementation of the Brave New World. During the last three hundred years the genius of man has succeeded in creating a combination of science and technology which has remade the human environment. The next step in the logic of this historical development is that these virtually omnipotent forces should now be brought to bear upon the recalcitrant human species itself. In the interest of community, identity and stability, man himself needs to be remade in a new image. Only then (so the Planners romanticise) will complete social harmony prevail. Obviously this proposed refashioning of humanity is of supreme relevance to the domain of human rights.

THE PRODUCTION OF HUMANOIDS

It is becoming increasingly irrelevant to object that such a Great Plan for the human species would not be feasible. The entire resources of modern psychology, psychiatry and sociology would be at the disposal of the Conditioners. Backed by the judicious use of drugs and various electronic aids, such as implanted cerebral electrodes, it should be possible to raise a

generation of humanoids characterized by unprecedented harmony and conformity to prescribed behaviour-patterns.

To be really thorough, this refashioning of humanity should begin at the very beginning. In this regard, artificial insemination would ensure the use of the appropriate biological materials. Again the growth of human embryos in the laboratory seems to be just around the corner. This accomplishment would have the added advantage of removing the undesirable influences of meddling parents who are always so ill-equipped for their function of rearing children anyway. Having provided the Conditioners with the required biological material, the germ-cell donors can rest contented with the knowledge that they have done their progenitive duty for posterity.

Granted then, that it is, or soon will be, practically feasible, what objections could be made to this Great Plan for the instauration of universal harmony in the world? Not only is it the next logical step in the onward march of science, but it also happens to come at a time in the history of the human race when universal peace and harmony were never more desirable. The consequences of a full-scale war are so unthinkable. Again, when something becomes technically feasible the next irresistible step is to do it. Classical examples of

this are the space explorations and the landing of the first humans on the moon. Why not then proceed with the Great Plan for the refashioning of humanity?

Once the techniques have been established and the resources are available, the only objection to the Great Plan would be the timid voice of Tradition. The ageless injunction instructs us to do to others as we would have them do to us, but not to use others as mere means for the perfecting of posterity. For centuries, our civilization has been built upon this cornerstone and the many manifestations of compassion and consideration which it has begotten. Again as C. S. Lewis shows in the second section of The Abolition of Man, the Christian commandment to love one's fellow men can be seen as a particular expression of the grand Tao which has been the high road of morality in all great civilizations. It is then in the name of this seemingly universal morality that the voice of Tradition objects to the Great Plan.

It is conceivable that the Planners could be somewhat disconcerted by the voice of Tradition, especially when backed by the widespread objections of their contemporaries, in the name of Common Sense. The world may not be quite ready for their novel ideals. In this case and without sacrificing their ultimate goals, the wise thing to do would seem to be the tactic of the inevitability

of grandualism. The first step to ultimate acceptance would be the production of humanoids for the performance of all the unpleasant and routine tasks of a complex society; tasks which present-day workers find so repugnant. After the manner of the Government Hatchery and the Conditioning Centre of Huxley's Brave New World, the humanoids could be manufactured from the appropriate low-grade biological materials and properly conditioned so as to find utter joy in these otherwise repugnant tasks, with release of the present unwilling workers and obvious benefits in society in general.

Naturally enough, once society at large had overcome a few hang-ups about meddling with human nature, the appearance of the humanoids on the scene would provoke a great deal of interest and discussion, not to mention innumerable and very respectable learned treatises on the differences in reactions between humanoids and the man-in-the-street.

Other academics would further rationalize the situation by arguments to the effect that while slavery was a pretty common phenomenon of all societies, the flory of our society was its triumphant fabrication of the willing slave. The humanoid would have been so conditioned that he (or she) would choose his (or her)

menial task above all others in the world. These humanoids would be the proud product of all the ingenuity, learning and patient labours of the Conditioners.

The social integration of the humanoid (albeit on the lowest social rungs) would be the first step in the process of modifying the educational system to bring it "up to date" with the "latest scientific discoveries" by the gradual introduction of modified elements of Pavlovian and Skinnerian educational theory. With increased acceptance of these "modern" techniques, the way would be opened for a movement whose ultimate goal would be a widespread acceptance of the humanoid "educational" system and its many benefits for increasing harmony by disposing of the discontent which had previously been so universally endemic to the human race. Naturally, to ensure universal peace, it will be found necessary to extend the "new education" throughout the entire human species. At last, universal peace will prevail at a price of course:

If the fully planned and conditioned world...comes into existence, nature will be troubled no more by the restive species that rose in the revolt against her so many millions of years ago, will be vexed no longer by its chatter of truth and mercy and beauty and happiness, and if the eugenics are efficient enough there will be no second revolt, but all snug beneath the Conditioners and the Conditioners beneath her, till the moon falls or the sun grows cold. 5

THE CONQUEST OF NATURE

From the previous pages, it could be argued that I am not only pessimistic in outlook and markedly anti-scientific in spirit, but also exhibit symptoms of paranoia inasmuch as I am claiming that "they" are out to make slaves of us all. In reply, I must admit that there is some basis for these accusations, but on the other hand there is also some basis for the claims which I have been making for the possible outcome of the present predicament of humanity. Given a few more pages, I hope to offer some substantiation of my speculations on the possible fate of human rights in the brave new world.

As far as my being anti-scientific is concerned, it is pertinent to present considerations that my first academic grounding was in the sciences, so that I do not speak merely as a biased humanist with no true knowledge of the "scientific outlook".

The thing which has struck me as most interesting about the sciences is that in general, despite their prodigious powers of penetration as regards the "material" aspects of things, they are helpless in the face of the great questions of truly human concern. What is the good life for man to live? What is happiness? What of the restless yearnings of humanity for truth, beauty and

goodness? What is the significance of the religious experience, which (like hope) springs eternally from the human breast? These and other such questions which ever haunt the human race in proportion to the development of its humanity are all too easily brushed aside by the superficial type of trousered ape as being of no consequence.

The above questions are but a few of the multitudes which are of recurring relevance to the human experience. They make for the examined life which is truly worth living. Yet any one of these questions is so vast as to defy complete exploration in the short span of a lifetime. Take the question of happiness for example. As Aristotle observes in the beginning of his Nicomachean Ethics, happiness is the ultimate goal of all human striving and is that for the sake of which all else is done. Yet, what is happiness? Lewis Mumford, in his The Pursuit of Happiness, has given some idea of the incredible variety of answers to this question which is supremely relevant to the human condition, yet it is one before which any one of the sciences or all the sciences combined must stand in self-confessed ignorance. It is a question, not for the scientist, but for the man of wisdom and even he, the wiser he becomes the more contented he is, not with final answers, but with actions in the light

of wisely chosen directions.

Again on the subject of my supposed pessimism and paranoia in regard to the prospects of an omnipotent science producing the Brave New World of Huxley's novel, it is only realistic to contemplate the possibility of such an outcome of a trend which has long been in existence. In the course of the last three hundred years or so, science has acquired a tremendous momentum which threatens to crush all human values in its wake. Indeed this is already seen to be the case with some of the more obvious repercussions of our scientific technology. Man is becoming increasingly subordinated to the rhythm of inanimate machines. Too, in more recent years, ecological disaster and the destruction not only of the human species, but of almost all living things is being seen as imminent in the very near future.

Indeed the problems posed by a hitherto seemingly beneficent scientific technology are so complex as to defy summarization. It may well be that the Brave New World or something very akin to it may soon appear as the only way out of our multitude of dilemmas. If such proves to be the case, it will not be because "they" have been conspiring against the rest of us but rather the inevitable result of a certain historical momentum whose eventual outcome has not been adequately foreseen and prevented.

2

Posterity adopted all too readily Francis Bacon's call to the conquest of nature through science and human power. In the first place, it was not appreciated that man himself is a part of nature, so that the conquest of nature also involved the conquest of man himself, but with certain ominous implications:

"Man's conquest of nature, if the dreams of some scientific planners are realized, means the rule of a few hundreds of men over billions of men. There neither is nor can be any simple increase of power on Man's side. Each new power won by man is a power over man as well. Each advance leaves him weaker as well as stronger."⁶

In the second place while scientific man may have been very clever in the past, the consequences of his discoveries and their implications have shown that he has not been nearly clever enough. All too naively he thought of "nature" as some amorphous entity out there, waiting to be shaped to his own desires. The source of this is not hard to find. The rejection of all anthropomorphic interpretations of nature by the scientists was hailed as "progress". They were brave men (so it seemed), discarding all the accumulated ignorance of past centuries.

Yet perhaps the ancients were far wiser that we will concede. They thought of Nature as a mother-goddess - Natura, ambivalently beneficent to those who won her heart

and wished to live in harmony with her, but vengeful towards those who would exploit and rape her to their own selfish ends. Until quite recently, modern man had not at all reckoned with the power of mother Nature to strike back at her violators, even (when it is warranted) with apocalyptic finality:

"Man's conquest of Nature turns out, in the moment of its consummation, to be Nature's conquest of Man. Each victory we seemed to win has let us, step by step, to this conclusion. All Nature's apparent reverses have been tactical withdrawals. We thought we were beating her back when she was luring us on. What looked to us like hands held up in surrender was really the opening of arms to enfold us forever."⁷

These words were written over a quarter of a century ago. It is most significant that their relevance has increased tremendously over the intervening period of time, as is illustrated principally by the growing concern over the ecological crisis. Indeed, to some eminent authorities the end is not far off. We have been warned by a variety of ecological experts that the present trend of our scientific technology can only be ultimately disastrous, but the trend continues nonetheless. The acquired momentum of the preceding centuries cannot easily be decelerated, let alone turned off. Meanwhile

ecological doomsday is drawing relentlessly nearer, if we are to take the experts seriously. Given this situation, then it is not improbable that last desperate efforts to salvage humanity may well involve widespread abrogation of human values and of human rights in the face of ultimate disaster.

On the other hand, we can be optimistic and hope and act with a determined intention of averting the ultimate catastrophe which is already looming up as a result of centuries of folly. In this regard, it is encouraging to see the re-emergence of the vein of sanity which has run (all too often underground) through human history. The advantages of the reign of scientific technology have been all too obvious. New hope is being born in the increasing pre-occupation with the disadvantages of unquestioned subservience to the twin gods of science and technology. This concern is of course most evident in the domain of ecology, where the disastrous results of man's rape of nature can no longer be ignored. Despite the tremendous importance of remedying the ecological ravages which scientific "progress" has perpetrated, it is not my intention to deal directly with this aspect of the matter here since it lies outside the topic of human rights. The question of particular import in the present treatise is what grievous aberrations of thought lie at

the basis of our present scientific tradition.

We are concerned above all with fundamental errors right at the roots of the modern western mentality - initial errors which now threaten the tradition of human values and therefore of human rights. The consequences of these aberrations have increased and multiplied across the centuries, for as Aristotle has well observed - parvus error in principio magnus est in fine - a small error in the beginning is a large error in the end. In the present context we have seen the logical end of a view of the world which would reduce all phenomena to the motion of atoms in the void - there can be at best but scant respect for human values and human rights, for man himself becomes reduced to nothing more than a mere conglomerate of such atoms and is to be dealt with in the same manner as the rest of "material" creation - to be remade in this manner or that, according to the whimsical wisdom of the Conditioners.

THE DEATH OF HISTORY

To attempt to prognosticate about humanity on the basis of its present condition is a venture which would be both perilous and presumptuous. At best we can strive to have some educated guesses about the directions in which the insistent pressures of the past will tend to push us. Yet, in making this modest claim, we are apt

to be impatiently assailed by those "modern" thinkers who are much too easily convinced of the irrelevance of the past. All that is needed (so they claim) is a good head on your shoulders and you can figure out things for yourself. Above all, they see the truly effective intelligence as one which has been liberated from the chains of the past. Nor are they alone in this claim. Indeed, this has been the general tenor of intellectual history for the past three hundred years. Best known of the pioneers for this mentality is the influential René Descartes who, in his Discourse on Method, explicitly rejects the past as playing any important role in his quest for truth. Indeed, using an analogy from architecture, he objects to having to erect his own edifice of inquiry upon foundations which had been laid down by others. 8

Descartes' English contemporary, Francis Bacon, was no less derogatory about the past. In his great plan for the instauration of the sciences, he caustically dismisses all learning of the past as having constituted the boyhood of knowledge, because at that stage it could not generate or beget works of use to man from the knowledge acquired. With the establishment of Bacon's new science aimed at nothing less than the conquest of nature, knowledge being able to beget works of human utility, would at last have entered into manhood. And

this form of knowledge it was which came increasingly to be regarded as true science. This in itself would not have been quite so bad were it not for the fact that the humanities thereby came into disrepute. More and more, they were seen as fringe benefits to the good life made possible through science and technology.

It would be sheer romanticism of course, to picture the sanity of the human race as dependent upon the continuous academic pursuit of the humanities. However, what is significant about Bacon and Descartes (ironically enough, in addition to their influence upon subsequent thinkers) is their emphatic rejection of all prior intellectual achievements. To borrow a metaphor from Marcus Aurelius, they can be seen as limbs which would separate themselves from the great Tree of Tradition.

As subsequent events demonstrated, Bacon and Descartes were merely the fore-runners of a mentality which was to become common coinage in the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. Thus, Edward Gibbon's Decline and Fall called for a rejection of the entire Christian tradition and a return to the ideals of ancient Rome in pre-Christian times. Men it seemed has been misunderstanding history for some seventeen hundred years. However, history was not so easily eluded. As Carl Becker has argued in his The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century

Philosophers, even the great constructive thinkers of that period were later found to be labouring very much under the influence of the middle ages.

Meanwhile, much of the Enlightenment's confidence in naked reason, bereft of all historical impediments, derived from the genius of Sir Isaac Newton and his formulations of the physical laws which seemed to account for all events of the universe. In this regard, the great new key-science was neither theology nor metaphysics, but as Descartes had so rightly intimated (no doubt being indebted to Galileo) the new queen of the sciences was to be mathematics. Newton's influence upon his own age and subsequent ones was to be paramount. As his contemporary and compatriot, Alexander Pope wrote of him:

"Nature and Nature's laws lay hid
in night;
God said - Let Newton Be! and
all was Light!"

But this new view of the universe and its contents, a view which was to become so vastly influential, was devoid of all reference to the dimension of history. The historical aspect of human experience was increasingly seem as quite irrelevant to the understanding of what seemed to be the ultimate realities at last revealed to man by the revolutionary newtonian physics. If the leading thinkers of the eighteenth century entertained this suspicion

of the irrelevance of history, it seemed overwhelmingly substantiated by the multitude of scientific and technological discoveries contained in the succeeding century.

Nineteenth century man was fabricating for himself a glittering world of scientific and technological achievements without precedent in the entire history of humanity.

At a humbler level, man's cleavage with history was perhaps deepest and most irreparable through the displacement of the peasantry brought about by the industrial revolution. Sacred folkways and centuries of traditions were destroyed with the uprooting of the peasants and their herding into anonymous cities. With this, the humblest but most fundamental form of history and tradition destroyed, their derivative expressions could not long survive. As subsequent events have amply demonstrated, the uprooting of the peasantry was but the preface to the mass-production of the rootless man of the twentieth century. William Whyte (Jr.) in his The Organization Man, has found that the more successful an ambitious executive is, the more often he must look forward to being moved by "the Company"

HUMAN RIGHTS IN A WORLD OF UPHEAVALS

In the previous pages, I have attempted to point out some of the more obvious sources of the death of that

sense of history which can give so much meaning to life. It would almost seem that I am a secret follower of Wilhelm Dilthey. At first sight this pre-occupation with history appears to have little to do with the topic of human rights. On the other hand, in the span of recent centuries it is possible to see two opposed tendencies locked in a life and death struggle. The recent past has been witness to the rise of innovation and the death of tradition. By and large, the sense of tradition has become increasingly irrelevant to the conduct of daily life, while the forces of innovation have become more and more important. The past (it seems) is so much water under the bridge.

It is the present and more particularly the future which are important. One must be ever ready to adapt and improvise, never knowing what is going to happen next. This phenomenon of the unexpected is of increasing relevance to our age, as Alvin Toffler has shown in his Future Shock. Moreover, not only is change accelerating, but the rate of change itself is on the acceleration. The years ahead will offer an interesting study of just where the human breaking-point occurs under increasing stress.

However for present purposes, the point of all this is: what can serve as the basis of human rights in this period of vast innovation which presently afflicts the human race? Or to put it in other words, how can we

find a secure and permanent basis for human rights in this particular phase of the human condition which is ruled (and permeated) by universal and restless change?

The answer to this question (if indeed it can be said to have one) is not easy. Plato, it would seem, was faced with a similar problem in attempting to explain the constant recurrence of natures in a world composed only of atoms in motion in the void, as the early Greek atomists maintained. Yet notwithstanding this great whirling of atoms, natures did constantly recur - lions begot cubs which grew into lions, and cabbages reproduced not antelopes or whales, but new little cabbages. Such constancy in a world composed (supposedly) only of whirling atoms, was indeed cause for great wonder. Yet the constancy of the recurrence of natures was indeed a fact, notwithstanding the theories of the atomists.

In order to account for this constancy and other similar phenomena in a world of whirling atoms, Plato was led to posit the existence of a superior World of Ideas. In this World there was no change and furthermore, since it contained the original models of each kind of thing, there was after all (and involving a little more explanation that we can go into here) a source of the constantly recurring natures in the world of whirling atoms.

It requires but little imagination to appreciate the fact that, taking our cue from Plato, the Christian idea of Heaven could be adapted to serving as a source of constancy in human rights and values in a world subject to unprecedented upheavals and changes. The only trouble is that so cataclysmic have been the upheavals of this age that all forms of tradition have been, or are being abolished and the idea of a Heaven just happens to be one of those many consoling things sanctioned by tradition. So out goes Heaven and with it, not only the traditional source of the moral order, but also of rewards and punishments beyond the grave to compensate for the obvious inequalities of this life.

Given the immense upheavals of the present age, it does become quite a problem to find some kind of solid basis for human rights and values in all the surrounding turmoil. Some would say that there is no need to look for such a foundation. Man (they say) has evolved morally across the centuries to such an extent that he no longer needs external coercion, or even directives telling him what is good and what is bad. He knows instinctively from his heart, being a highly evolved moral being. While this may be extremely flattering to the generation which happens to be inhabiting the face of the earth at the present time, even a glance at rising crime-rates suffices

to show the hollow falsity of this claim. Furthermore, while twentieth century man of the western world has comforts and conveniences which his ancestors never even dreamed about, there is no evidence to indicate that these benefits of science and technology have made him a better person. Our era will hardly be remembered for its compassion, love and kindness. Indeed, the opposite would seem to avail.

When seeking a source of human rights and values, we find ourselves in a rather unique position. We have no first principles which could fit the role, because we have apparently seen through the claims of all the moral systems of the past. But this achievement of "seeing through" such systems puts us in quite a predicament:

"You cannot go on 'seeing through' things forever. The whole point of seeing through something is to see something through it. It is good that the window should be transparent, because the street or garden beyond it is opaque. But what if you saw through the garden too? It is no use trying to 'see through' first principles. If you see through everything, then everything is transparent. But a wholly transparent world is an invisible world. To 'see through' all things is the same as not to see." 9

A last resort remains when attempting to find a solid and substantial basis for human rights and

values in the modern world of relentless change. We might be tempted to advocate the widespread promulgation of decrees, precisely as illustrated by the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Constant drumming of the same decrees into the public consciousness would (it seems) make for the desired permanent basis of human rights. After all, as Vance Packard has shown at length in his The Hidden Persuaders, the public psyche is most susceptible to brainwashing. By sufficient repetition on the mass-media, the Declaration of Human Rights could be instilled into the mind of every member of modern society. At last we would have something uniform and constant (assuming that the same formulary was repeated relentlessly).

Notwithstanding the benefits of publicizing the Declaration on the one hand and of advertising in "selling" a product on the other, there would seem to be a vast difference between the two. The fact that the Declaration has multinational backing however is not per se a distinguishing characteristic, for this can apply to such widespread commodities as wool, coal or petroleum. Notwithstanding such superficial similarities, the two types of venture could perhaps be best contrasted as expression and impression. In trying to sell such commodities as wool, coal, petroleum (or even new cars

and refrigerators) we are trying to impress people: we are pressing in on them, trying to persuade them that they need what we have for sale. By contrast however, the Declaration of Human Rights is an expression: a pressing out. It is an expression of the more obvious implications of the common element in the loftiest religions of mankind.

All people agree in asserting the sacred nature of the human person. But when we ask what is the basis of this belief, it can have no other foundations but beliefs which have received the blessings of ages: beliefs which have, by the sheer majesty of their monumental inertia, withstood all the changes in the tides of human fashions. We are speaking of course of a phenomenon which by definition cannot be allowed to exist in our present world of universal upheaval.

In other words, given the present condition of mankind, there is (as far as I can see), nothing in it which could serve as a permanent basis for anything, excepting of course, upheavals which beget more upheavals. We are, I would venture to suggest, like the storm-tossed ship where the best thing to do would seem to be to batten down the hatches and (hopefully) ride out the storm. This is not of course meant to deny a lack of involvement in the world. Each of us in his (or her) own little way can

influence the environment in which we live and move and have our being, and opt for the spirit of sanity which is attempting to regain some measure of control over the human race.

Pessimistic as the above paragraph may seem, there is growing evidence for its veracity. People are becoming increasingly disillusioned with the charm of science which has held them spellbound for the past few centuries. There is a growing suspicion that however penetrating its vision, science sees only one aspect of the great mystery which bears the facile label of "reality". There is consequently an increasing willingness to concede that other interpretations of reality have something of worth to contribute to the human vision.

The previous pages have been concerned with the unparalleled problems posed by the universal revolutions in science and technology. These twin giants have enormously boosted man's capacity for good in the world. At the same time, life has become immeasurably more complex, and if the Brave New World contains advantages unimaginable to the wildest dreams of our forebears, the new dangers which have entered the world are no less unprecedented. In particular, the subject of human rights in the new perspective is being forced to take more and more account of the influence of science and technology on this important

domain. This will be an area of increased concern to the ethical conscience of the world. In this regard, it is encouraging to see the growing emphasis of the United Nations precisely on human rights in such a perspective. Thus in the U.N. Yearbook of 1970 is to be remarked the Report of the Secretary General on Human Rights and Scientific and Technological Developments.

THE PRIMACY OF LIFE

For the past three hundred years, the great paradigm for understanding the universe has been the model of the machine. Further, when reduced to its ultimate elements, all was explainable by the motion of atoms in the void. What is capital about this manner of conceiving the universe and its contents is that it reduced all phenomena to the inanimate level. Even the wonder and the glory of human life was ultimately reducible (so it seemed) to amino acids linking up to form polypeptide chains, from which resulted (so simply on paper) protein chains and so eventually, human life itself. There was (or so it seemed) no longer any mystery to the phenomenon of life. All reduces (with audacious superficiality) to the motion of atoms in the void. As an Indian once so well remarked: "You white men think that everything is dead, but we know that everything is alive".

Fortunately, the beauty and wonder of life was not so easily explained out of the universe. Indeed, there is growing evidence that the mystery of life is beginning to assert its primacy over the inanimate realm:

"Ravaged and trampled upon, yet fierce in the face of death, the reality of life is again impressing itself upon us. The ecological crisis is nature's way of saying "Enough". The elements are speaking and they are saying that the wellsprings of life cannot be indefinitely poisoned. The social crisis, from revolt in the classroom to revolt in the colonies, is the human spirit's way of saying "Enough" - that our priorities must be reordered, that society must be organized on the principles of life." 10

We laugh at our ancestors of some centuries back for their conviction that they shared the earthly domain with gnomes, elves, goblins and other such fanciful beings. We are impatient with the traditional persuasion that the air was the dwelling place of demons. As for the belief that the regions above the moon were inhabited by the lower orders of angels, we consider this only slightly less far-fetched than the notion of a "heaven" peopled with the mightiest of spiritual beings and crowned with the very primal source of all existence and of life itself.

Being situated (as we so fondly love to believe) at the very summit of the evolutionary ladder, we can afford to regard these fanciful accounts of the Kingdom of the Living with ill-concealed impatience. Yet, all the while, it seems to me, we are missing the fundamental message conveyed in its manifold fanciful disguises: Life is the Ultimate! Our historical ancestors saw the universe as animated as teeming with life. We (in our superior wisdom) see it as teeming with inanimate atoms speeding in the void. I am inclined to think that Karl Menninger (author of Man Against Himself), would be tempted to view this aspect of our culture as the victory of the death-instinct over the instinct for life which is quite literally at the heart of every living thing. Life is the Ultimate! This truth is so basic as to be open to interpretation in its many dimensions. Indeed, if you have missed out on life, you have missed out on everything.

Yet our inanimate view of creation is not so culpable a crime. As the French say: "comprendre tout, c'est pardonner tout" - to understand all is to forgive all. For some three hundred years we have been intimidated with the vision of the clock-work universe with its multiple implications. Human ingenuity, particularly as manifested in the discoveries made possible by the lens-grinders, has revealed to man, previously quite unimaginable depths of space both above and below his own station.

Perhaps more than anything, these recent revelations have caused the human heart to quail and shrink before what Pascal has so memorably described as the terror of "the eternal silence and of the infinite spaces". Our earth appears as a speck of cosmic dust flirting circumferentially with a really small-time sun in a high-powered universe, to repeat Viereck's idea. What can possibly be the enduring significance of any kind of life (let alone human life) in such a perspective? A like despair results from delving into the subatomic world.

This is the triumph of the geometrical view of reality fostered by Galileo, Descartes and the Newtonian physics. Space becomes the all-important reality, in fact the basic reality. Quantity has won out over quality! In this perspective the inanimate aspect must always occupy pride of place. It would be folly to expect otherwise - akin to expecting palm trees to sprout from stones. The wonder of it all is that we have not realized long ago the folly of such expectations. The reason why the human intellect has not prevailed in this case, is that we have inherited all too unconsciously (but which is none the less evident in its effects) an attitude to science which borders on the reverence once accorded religion: Science reveals the invisible reality. Its many discoveries have blinded us to the fact that for all its inventiveness,

science merely sees one aspect of reality, and that as an aspect which is perfectly indifferent to the deepest aspirations of the human heart.

Hopefully, the growing disenchantment with science will breed, not an anti-scientific mentality, but a realization that for all its glorious achievements, science represents only one of the many disguises in which the great mystery of "reality" appears to us. Science is the proud product of the cold cutting edge of intellect alone. There are other (and more fully human) ways of communicating with reality. Conspicuously lacking are the apprehensions of the human heart, for after the words of Pascal, the heart has its reasons whereof the head knows nothing. And this age is all too unfamiliar with the visions of the heart, dismissing them as idle illusions, when compared with the sharp cutting edge of intellect.

The modern age is an age of science indeed, but together an age in which the human intellect has over-reached itself. Mind has made unprecedented conquests, but at the expense of the heart. If the head of modern man seems so large, it is merely because his chest is so small (to borrow a comparison from C.S. Lewis). A return to the conception of the primacy of life in the universe would have as one of its first fruits, the rebirth of the visions of the heart. And this hitherto waning dimension

of human experience would immediately sound forth the celebration of life and of love in song and poetry, the language of the heart itself.

We are timid of course at the thought of such a prospect because for all too long dance has been dead and singing confined only to the "professionals" thus making of it the equivalent of a "spectator sport". As for the beauties of the universe, they are by and large wasted upon cerebral man. To put it all in a nutshell, it would be said that we are indeed a most inhibited breed, afraid of love in all its manifestations and therefore afraid of life itself. The passionless, predictable world of Newtonian physics offers a much safer terrain for such a breed of timid humanity. Much of this derives no doubt too, from our puritanical background, for to use a quote for which I am indebted to my good friend Alden Nowlan: "The Puritan is one who is persistently tormented by the suspicion that somehow, somewhere someone might be enjoying himself."

THE MIND AND HEART OF MAN

I am not denying the great progress that has been made in the western world since the Enlightenment. Not only have the sciences been successful beyond man's wildest dreams in unravelling the mysteries of the

universe, but also there have arisen traditions and institutions which to an unprecedented degree seek to ensure the rights of the individual. Never in the known history of humanity has there been such concerted attempts at guaranteeing the basic freedoms to all, regardless of race, colour and creed. I have already attempted to express this phenomenon of liberation in my The Rise of Human Rights. The apex of this movement is the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which on the twenty-fifth anniversary of its promulgation, was the inspiration of the present inquiry.

However, at this particular stage of our achievements with the guaranteeing of basic freedoms, it would seem more imperative than ever to pledge ourselves to another, and ever more difficult aspect of the enterprise. The mind of man has worked wonders in the realization of the present accomplishments. As a result, we not only have the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which all member nations subscribe, but also the channels of communication for bringing infringements into the international forum. Yet the most difficult work lies ahead, for the next challenge concerns not the mind of man, but the human heart itself.

In the previous pages, I have been concerned how to show that the "scientific" view of the universe was

totally indifferent not only to the phenomenon of life, but more particularly to the values which make life truly human. Further back we looked at the problem of finding a secure basis for human values and human rights in a world caught up in the turmoil of scientific and technological change. Our plight in this kind of world has been rendered all the more desperate by the fact that the transformations effected by science and technology have been so enormous as to sever us from all appeal to precedent. This was dramatically evident from the logic of the scientific revolution whose momentum should carry us on to the Brave New World of Huxley.

In the opening pages of this inquiry I alluded to the possibility that if the foundations upon which the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights should prove deficient, the entire superstructure could collapse all the more dramatically because of the impressive edifice which it supported. We have now turned full circle and are back at basics - the foundation which sustains the entire superstructure.

Against the dangers which I have mentioned in the preceeding two paragraphs, it would seem to me that recourse must be had to the ennobling of the very heart of man. Hitherto the great advances of our culture have almost exclusively been made on the intellectual level.

But intellect can only take us so far. It is time to develop the other dimension of our human potentiality. It is time to bring the heart of man into accord with the products of reason. It is time to wed understanding with love. Let me try to explain more fully what I mean by this.

Upon reading through the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, we remark on how it strives to bring before all Member States the great ideals of the essential equality of all men (and of all women) before the law, and thus to ensure that all people, regardless of race, colour, creed, or other arbitrary disqualifications, have equal claim upon the ideals as set forth in the Declaration. Further, it seeks to eliminate possible abuses, such as arbitrary arrests and imprisonment, as well as torture and other forms of abuse of the person. As regards the judiciary system of a country, the Declaration insists upon the right of every individual to a fair trial and adequate legal representation. Further, within the civil life of the state, each individual has right to the basic freedoms, including privacy, free movement, the right to marry and raise a family, to own property and to earn a living wage. Further, all citizens have the right to freedom of expression and of peaceful assembly as well as participation in the life and

government of the country. These are the more obvious of the basic human rights which the Universal Declaration seeks to promulgate.

Thus far however, we are dealing with the objectification of desirable norms. The ideals are promulgated for all to see. This is all well and good - it is the first step to prevention of arbitrary abuses of power, privilege and persons. Once objectified as in the Universal Declaration, it becomes somewhat less difficult to see when a transgression has occurred. The next step requires not merely that all men should understand the contents of the Declaration, but that they should quite literally take them to heart. Here we are dealing with the apprehension of the human heart, to which reference has already been made.

The above distinction may at first sight appear to be a very trite one. However further thought reveals that this is not so. We might compare it to the distinction between the letter and the spirit, as when Saint Paul observes that the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life. The letter of the law is one thing, the spirit is quite another. One can become so absorbed in the details of legislation as totally to forget the whole *raison d'être* of the laws. Thus, we have the sterile pharisaical legalism of the Old Testament. Or again, in

the context of the Bible, we can call to mind the complaint of Jehovah that his chosen people honoured him with their lips, but their hearts were far from him.

Law which moves men totally must be apprehended totally. This involves, not merely knowing the law, but also taking it (quite literally) to heart. In these days when intellect reigns supreme, it is not fashionable to speak thus, but I am doing it nonetheless. One may, for present purposes, contrast this with taking the law to mind. This involves merely intellectual cognizance of the law and all its details. But being merely intellectual, this involves of itself, nothing of the heart of man.

This may seem like quibbling about irrelevant details, but observe in a pragmatic manner, the different fruits of both approaches. When the law is taken only to mind, then its only challenge is to the mind of man. And since the appetites are not thereby committed, this leaves man free to figure out all kinds of ways of getting around the law. It is the old challenge "to beat the system". But when the law is also taken to heart, then it compels total obedience. Thus Socrates (due to what some may describe as an overscrupulous conscience) spurned the offers of escape and died under the sentence which his Athens had inflicted upon him.

If the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights is taken only to mind, it thereby invites the same evasions, as indicated previously; or at best, mere lip-service to a system of rules and regulations constructed by the human intelligence. The problem therefore is how to ensure as far as possible that the Declaration is also taken to heart. On this point, our previous distinction between impressing and expressing also comes to the fore: the Declaration is not primarily an attempt to impress people by flashing before their minds like some kind of neon sign. Rather it is an organized effort to express something, and indeed to express something of the human heart.

THE TREE OF TRADITION

In working over this distinction between taking the law to mind and taking it to heart, I am tempted to see the difference exemplified in the contrast between those countries which have managed to maintain the traditions of the past and those which have rejected such traditions. It would be a mistake to oppose these as the static versus the dynamic. That is not what is intended here. A society which seeks to remain ever the same is just as vain as an individual who wants always to remain at the same age, or stage of growth. It would be a dead

society, for to be alive is to grow.

The contrast would be better expressed as evolution versus revolution. The former aims to grow out of the past, while the latter is an attempt to create a cleavage with the past; to begin (if possible) entirely from the present. Evolution is transformational, revolution is traumatic. Growth occurs by digesting the hard facts of experience and absorbing the new nutrients into the older body of truth. William James has well expressed the process in his essay on Pragmatism:

"That new idea is truest which performs most felicitously its function of satisfying our double urgency. It makes itself true, gets itself classified as true, by the way it works; grafting itself then upon the ancient body of truth, which thus grows much as a tree grows by the activity of a new layer of cambrium." 11

It can be argued that countries which can thus absorb the novel into their already existing organisms can not only use the new for further growth, but have preserved their continuity with the past. In such countries, law speaks with the authority of history. The appeal of law is therefore more to the heart, for under such conditions law is seen as the fruit of the great Tree of Tradition, whose roots reach back deep into the

soil of the past.

By contrast, the country which is continually racked with revolutions must deal with law more on an ad hoc basis. In such a country, law cannot speak with any other authority but that of force and threatened punishments. Under such conditions, law is seen rather as the product of legal minds and the obvious challenge is to "beat the system", because its appeal is primarily to the head of man, rather than to his heart. I have attempted in the previous pages to show just how strongly the scientific and technological revolutions have tended towards this type of society, particularly in the absence of corrective measures.

It seems to me that in an age where tradition is so unpopular the day is dawning nonetheless for a complete re-appraisal of the role of the momentum of history in human affairs. This, it would seem, is the great lifeblood which has too long been denied the human heart. For too many people, history is seen as having begun in the twentieth century, with the invention of TV. Others (more generous souls), would extend the notion to the nineteenth century (seeing that it contained the invention of the radio and the motion picture machine). In neither case is there any mature notion of man as essentially a

historical animal. The cause of this myopia has already been indicated in the previous pages.

The rise of science and of technology have resulted in the death of a sense of history. Man became a one-dimensional animal - progress is the all important thing. Only the future mattered, or so it seemed. Consequently, as has been seen, history succumbed to the armies of innovation. What should have been a both-and became an either-or - either the future or the past. And so the great Tree of Tradition was deprived of its roots. It continued to grow quite spectacularly of course, but the reason for this were the ever-frustrated attempts to put down new roots. This phenomenon could not continue indefinitely.

The greatest hopes for humanity do not therefore lie in the future alone. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights cannot be built only on the future aspirations of the human race. This is to attempt to build without foundations. In this perspective, the promulgation of such rights can at best be an attempt to impress the world at large, in terms of the ambitions of a vocal collectivity. We have already had occasion in the previous pages to deal with this notion of impress with respect to the Declaration. We contrasted it with the Declaration as an expression - an expression of the noblest spirit which has continually

manifested itself in the course of human history, side-by-side with the less inspiring kinds of human behaviour. Thus understood as the expression of the noblest aspirations of mankind across the centuries, the Declaration acquires a grandeur and authority which it would not otherwise possess. It speaks not merely in the name of those associated with its promulgation, but with the noblest voice of historical humanity.

This aspect of the Declaration is not merely a cold intellectual insight, nor is it mere cheap sentimentality. It is feeling indeed, but feeling which has been purchased at great price through untold centuries of suffering and sacrifice. Knowing this is one thing, realizing it is another. Through the former we have some cerebral knowledge of the past. It does not really touch us. But in realizing it we take it not merely to mind, but more importantly to heart. We empathise with those who have gone before. It is in essence, the proverbial distinction between a mere knowledge of history and a sense of history.

The effective promulgation of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights therefore requires much more than the involvement of the various mass-media. It necessitates above all, that our scientific and technological culture return to its human roots and admit

again that man is much more than an undimensional animal which lives only for the future. The claim can, I believe, be made with some justification, that for the past few centuries western man has been in flight - afraid to stay still and even more afraid of looking behind him. There is growing evidence that this attitude is becoming increasingly unacceptable. The bright appeal of progress is beginning to tarnish and with this growing disillusionment, a vague yearning for some hypothetical stage in the past when life was somewhat less complicated and everything was less obviously evanescent.

Inasmuch as he lives only in the present, man attempts to live by bread alone. To live also in the future is at least to aspire. But neither of these aspects of man can continue to flourish if deprived of the all-important roots back into the soil of the past. It is this dimension above all which provides the spiritual dimension to life, a fact which is well remarked upon by Herman Hesse:

"In matters of the spirit, a life simply in the present, in the modern and most modern, is unbearable and meaningless.... the life of the spirit is made possible only by constant reference to what is past, to history, to the ancient and primeval." 12

Hopefully the rebirth of the historical dimension of man will be witness to the decline of a short-sighted, destructive individualism on the one hand, and on the other the complementary rise of the commanding notion of the far greater good of the human community. Not only will such a perspective transcend all limitations of race, colour and creed, but it will also extend up and down the corridors of time so that each person will come to see himself (or herself) as he (or she) truly is - an important member of the great Tree of Humanity whose trunk is the present, whose roots search back deep into the soil for the past, and whose branches and leaves reach up to the noblest aspirations of the future.

What is needed is not merely some Great Plan for humanity, however intellectually complex, incredibly detailed and incomprehensible to the average citizen, but rather some Great Vision which will lay hold of the very heart of humanity itself and lift it to universal compassion, love and understanding. Surely the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the first step in this direction.

THE UNITED NATIONS 1948 - 1973;
A QUARTER CENTURY OF HUMAN RIGHTS

The previous pages have been concerned, not with the obvious advantages of the reign of science and technology, but with some of the less appreciated disadvantages. In particular, we have been concerned with examining the momentum of history exemplified in the scientific revolution and its foreseeable repercussions upon the domain of human rights. As has been observed, this is also a subject of growing concern to the United Nations. Yet, in between the initial Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the present preoccupations of the United Nations with the effects of science and technology, there have been many other developments in the domain of human rights and in which the United Nations has been the prime mover. In the concluding pages, some general idea will be given of these accomplishments.

The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted and proclaimed by the General Assembly of December 10th, 1948. It is noteworthy that two other important documents had already been adopted in that same year. The first of these was that of Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, which was adopted on July 9th. The second important document adopted was the Convention on the

Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted on December 9, or the day preceding the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The former was concerned with workers' rights, the latter with mass-crimes against humanity. The differences in subject-matter of these documents was an early indication of the United Nations universal concern with human rights, no matter what the context.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 marks what can be regarded as the inauguration of an international bill of human rights. In this regard, the year 1966 was to mark the adoption of three other important documents. The first of these was the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, complemented by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The third document in the same domain, and adopted at the same time, was the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Twenty years after the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Conference on Human Rights met at Teheran to review the progress made in the intervening years and to formulate a programme for the future. The document issued by this assembly therefore became known as the Proclamation of Teheran. Among other things, it re-emphasized the need for truly international

education in the domain of those human rights possessed by all members of the human family without regard to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political and other such bases of discrimination.

The Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, to which reference has already been made and which was adopted in 1948 can be regarded as the first of the documents on freedom of association. The following year of 1949 witnessed the adoption of the Convention Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organize and to Bargain Collectively, to be followed in 1971 by the Convention concerning Protections and Facilities to be Afforded to Workers' Representatives in the Undertaking. All three documents were the product of the International Labour Office. This same body had been responsible for the Convention Concerning Employment Policy of 1964. All documents aimed at safeguarding the rights of workers on an international scale and at promoting full, productive and freely chosen employment.

The third document approved in 1948 and to which reference has already been made was the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The horrors of the Second World War had shocked the world into the need for such an international agreement. Twenty years later, in 1968, the United Nations adopted the Convention on the Non-Applicability of

Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity.

Allied with the concern of the United Nations about such crimes against humanity was disapproval of the continued existence in the modern world of such practices as slavery and forced labour. In this regard the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted in 1949 the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others. Even before the era of the United Nations, at Geneva in 1926, an International Slavery Convention had been signed with a view to eliminating the practice. However, this did not enter into force until 7 July 1955 under the auspices of the United Nations. Two years earlier, in 1953, the General Assembly had approved the Protocol amending the Slavery Convention signed at Geneva on 25 September 1926. Finally, in 1956 a Conference of Plenipotentiaries adopted the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices similar to Slavery.

Among the harrowing after-effects of the Second World War were questions of international concern on such matters as refugees, statelessness and political asylum. In 1950 the United Nations adopted the first document in this regard - the Statute of the Office of the United

Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, a document to be followed promptly in the next year by the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Further work in the same direction resulted in the 1954 adoption of the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. The nationality of married women was set out in a Convention of 1957. In 1961 a Convention was adopted relating to the reduction of statelessness. Finally, on the matters relating to nationality and refugees, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted in 1967 the Declaration of Territorial Asylum, which set out the conditions under which asylum could be granted to a person by the State involved.

The first of the international documents on specific areas of discrimination was the Equal Remuneration Convention of 1951 which sought equal pay for men and women under the same conditions of work. The next notable achievement in this area was the 1958 Convention on Discrimination in Employment and Occupation, which was followed in 1960 by a similar document on discrimination in education. In 1962, the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization adopted a Protocol instituting a Conciliation and Good Offices Commission for dealing with disputes arising between States Parties to the Convention against Discrimination in Education adopted two years earlier. All

forms of racial discrimination came under censure in a United Nations Declaration of 1963, which was embodied in an International Convention two years later. Finally, in 1967 the General Assembly proclaimed a Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. On the subject of women's rights, it is noteworthy that as early as 1952 the United Nations had adopted the Convention on the Political Rights of Women.

With the 1952 Convention on the International Right of Correction, the United Nations General Assembly recommended measures for combating the dissemination of false or distorted reports likely to injure friendly relations between States. This represented the venture of the United Nations into the new field of freedom of information in the cause of international peace and goodwill.

The United Nations began to concern itself with safeguarding the rights of marriage and of the family with its 1959 Declaration of the Rights of the Child. This was followed in 1962 by the Convention on Consent to Marriage, which involved minimum age and the registration of all marriages. These matters received further attention in a 1965 resolution of the General Assembly. Finally, on youth in general, the Declaration of 1965 sought specifically to promote ideals of peace, mutual respect and international understanding among the young people of the world.

Beginning in 1960 with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the United Nations began to concern itself with a people's right of self-determination. Two years later, the same theme found expression in a resolution of the General Assembly dealing with permanent sovereignty over natural resources. On the other hand, the Declaration of the Principles of International Co-operation in 1966 (by the General Conference of UNESCO) stressed not only the right of each people to its own culture, but also the enriching influences that cultures can exert upon one another, forming as they do, all part of the common human heritage. More recently, the 1969 Declaration on Social Progress and Development stressed the rights of all people to participate in social progress and the conditions necessary to promote such growth. Finally, the latest of the United Nations Declarations expresses concern even for those individuals from whom comparatively little growth can be expected. Accordingly there was proclaimed in 1971, the Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons.

The previous few pages have attempted to give some idea of the tremendous amount of progress that has been made on an international level towards peace and the perfectioning of man by the United Nations during its quarter-century of existence. The actual documents are

to be found collected together in Human Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments of the United Nations, published by the United Nations (New York, 1973). Finally, for an outstanding collection of studies on the subject of human rights by the leading minds of our age, the reader is referred to Human Rights: Comments and Interpretations, a Symposium edited by UNESCO, with an Introduction by Jacques Maritain (Allen Wingate, London & New York, 1949).

FOOTNOTES

1. Statistics of Illiteracy (prepared for the World Conference of Minister of Education on the Eradication of Illiteracy), Teheran, Sept. 1965. See also: World Illiteracy at Mid-Century; A Statistical Survey, Paris 1957.
2. Bernard Murchland, The New Iconoclasm; Reflections for a Time of Transition (Dell) 1972, p.11.
3. George Sylvester Viereck, Seven Against Man (Flanders Hall) Scotch Plains, N. J., 1941, pp. 30-31.
4. C. S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man; Or Reflections on Education with Special Reference to the Teaching of English in the Upper Forms of Schools (MacMillan 1947) p. 36.
5. C. S. Lewis, op. cit., p. 43.
6. C. S. Lewis, op. cit., p. 37.
7. C. S. Lewis, op. cit., p. 43.
8. René Descartes, Discourse on Method. The example is found after the opening lines of part two.
9. C. S. Lewis, op. cit., p. 50.
10. Bernard Murchland, op. cit., pp. 111-112.
11. William James, Pragmatism p. 92 in the Meridian Books Edition (1955).
12. Quoted from Herman Hesse's "Life Story Briefly Told". The quote is found on p. 48 in Autobiographical Writings; Herman Hesse, New York (Farrar, Strauss & Giroux) 1971.